

Message Text

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DPW-01 IO-14 AID-20 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 DRC-01 /181 W

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R 111049Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8030

INFO AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY SAIGON

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 WARSAW 1321

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINR

SUBJECT: ICCS: NEW POLDEL AMBASSADOR

REFS: (A) STATE 45415 (NOTAL); (B) SAIGON 2445 (NOTAL);
(C) WARSAW 1134 (NOTAL); (D) SAIGON 2740 (NOTAL);
(E) WARSAW 1233 (NOTAL)

1. SPASOWSKI'S MARCH 7 DINNER LASTED THREE HOURS, DURING WHICH I MADE THE POINTS SET FORTH IN REFTELS. THE EXCHANGE WAS GENERALLY FRANK ON BOTH SIDES, ALTHOUGH THE THREE POLES APPEARED SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSED BY MY CONTENTION THAT THEIR GOVERNMENT WAS COLLABORATING WITH HANOI IN A CAMPAIGN TO OBTAIN DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF THE PRG; THEY DID NOT REALLY OFFER A REPLY ON TO THIS POINT. SPASOWSKI CONFIRMED THE STATEMENT HE HAD MADE TO ME IN DECEMBER (WARSAW 6473 PARAGRAPH 6) WITH REGARD TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF ADDITIONAL SUB-REGIONAL TEAMS. HE MADE A POINT OF SAYING REPEATEDLY THAT MABASSADOR FIJALKOWSKI WAS GOING TO SAIGON UNDER EXACTLY THE SAME GENERAL IN-
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STRUCTIONS AS HAD BEEN GIVEN TO AMBASSADOR KULAGA: TO

DO EVERYTHING HE REASONABLY COULD TO FURTHER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENTS, WHICH THE POLISH GOVERNMENT CONTINUED STRONGLY TO SUPPORT, AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO ENTER INTO CONTACT WITH THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN SAIGON AND CONDUCT A CANDID AND CONTINUING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH AMERICAN OFFICIALS ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE ICCS.

2. I HAVE GROUPED BELOW UNDER SUBJECT HEADS REMARKS WHICH OCCURRED AT DIFFERENT CHRONOLOGICAL POINTS IN THE CONVERSATION.

3. POLDEL-US EMBASSY CONTACTS. KULAGA WARMLY EXPRESSED HIS PROFESSIONAL RESPECT FOR AMBASSADOR MARTIN, MINISTER APPLING, AND FIRST SECRETARY BYRD AND THE EMBASSY TEAM CHARGED WITH ICCS LIAISON. HE APPEARED GENUINELY APPRECIATIVE OF THE OPPORTUNITIES HE HAD HAD FOR CONSULTATION WITH THESE OFFICIALS. I SAID THAT THE AMBASSADOR WAS EQUALLY APPRECIATIVE OF KULAGA'S EFFORT TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE EMBASSY AND URGED THAT, SHORTLY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL IN SAIGON (NOW PLANNED FOR THE FIRST DAYS OF APRIL), FIJALKOWSKI ASK FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH AMBASSADOR MARTIN AND ARRANGE TO MEET MINISTER APPLING AND PRATT BYRD. AT THIS POINT, SPASOWSKI SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THIS WITH FIJALKOWSKI AND HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO PROCEED IN THIS FASHION. SPASOWSKI EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE AMBASSADOR WOULD BE ABLE TO RECEIVE FIJALKOWSKI SOON AFTER HIS ARRIVAL. I SAID THAT I WOULD RECOMMEND THIS TO AMBASSADOR MARTIN AND HEREBY SO DO.

4. INVESTIGATIONS. I SAID TO SPASOWSKI AND KULAGA THAT, AS THEY KNEW, I CONSIDERED CONSULTATION BETWEEN US A NECESSITY, BUT THAT IT WAS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR ACTION. IN THIS CONNECTION, I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY MY GOVERNMENT TO EXPRESS OUR CONTINUING DISSATISFACTION WITH CERTAIN BASIC FAILURES OF THE ICCS AND OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE POLISH DELEGATION. FIRST AMONG THESE WAS THE FACT THAT, DESPITE THE DECISION OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 28, THERE HAD

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STILL BEEN NO INVESTIGATIONS OF SUCH IMPORTANT INCIDENTS AS THE ATTACKS AT LE MINH, ON BEIN HOA AIR BASE, ON THE NHA BE FUEL DEPOT, IN WESTERN QUANG DUC PROVINCE, AND ON THE UNARMED FPJMT CASUALTY-RESOLUTION TEAM ON DECEMBER 15, IN WHICH TWO TEAM MEMBERS, ONE AN AMERICAN OFFICER, HAD BEEN KILLED. THERE WAS THUS A COMPLETE STANDSTILL IN AN AREA OF ACTIVITY PROVIDED FOR IN THE PARIS AGREEMENTS. WE FELT IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT TO MOVE IN THIS AREA AND

AMBASSADOR FIJALKOWSKI SHOULD BE AWARE THAT, IN WASHINGTON AND SAIGON, U.S. OFFICIALS CONTINUED TO PLACE A GREAT DEAL OF EMPHASIS ON THE NECESSITY OF ACTION. I ADDED THAT, AS I HAD ALWAYS SAID IN DISCUSSIONS OF THIS SUBJECT, WE WERE NOT TALKING ABOUT THE ICCS'S INVESTIGATING CHARGES BROUGHT ONLY BY ONE OF THE PARTIES; WE WERE TALKING ABOUT A PROCESS OF INVESTIGATION WHICH, IN THE SPIRIT OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE ICCS, WOULD DEAL EVENHANDEDLY WITH ANY CASE IN WHICH THE ICCS HAD ADEQUATE GROUNDS FOR CONSIDERING THAT A VIOLATION HAD OCCURRED.

5. AMBASSADOR KULAGA THEN SAID THAT, SINCE HE HAD ONLY ARRIVED IN WARSAW EARLIER IN THE DAY, HE HAD NOT HAD AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS AND OTHER MATTERS WITH SPASOWSKI AND FIJALKOWSKI. HE THEREFORE WOULD SAY WHAT HE HAD IN MIND ONLY IN A PERSONAL CAPACITY, ON THE BASIS OF THE EXPERIENCE HE HAD GAINED IN SAIGON. THESE INCIDENTS HAD HAPPENED LONG AGO. INVESTIGATIONS NOW, EVEN IF THE ICCS SHOULD UNDERTAKE THEM, WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE CONCLUSIVE. SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF SUCH INVESTIGATIONS, IF IT COULD BE EFFECTED, WOULD RESULT IN POINTING THE FINGER OF BLAME AT ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER. STRESSING AGAIN THAT THIS WAS HIS PERSONAL VIEW, KULAGA SAID HE HAD TO ASK HIMSELF WHETHER SUCH AN APPORTIONMENT OF BLAME WOULD FACILITATE OR HINDER THE PROGRESS OF WHAT HE REGARDED AS THE HEART OF THE PROCESS OF RESTORING PEACE IN SOUTH VIETNAM, I.E., RESOLUTION BY THE TWO

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AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY SAIGON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

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PARTIES--THE GRV AND THE PRG--OF THE POLITICAL DIFFERENCES WHICH DIVIDE THEM. HIS VIEW WAS THAT THE EFFORT TO CONDUCT SUCH INVESTIGATIONS WOULD SIMPLY RESULT IN THE CREATION OF CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES AND WOULD LEAD TO THE ADOPTION OF RIGID POSITIONS ON BOTH SIDES WHICH WOULD CLEARLY NOT HELP MOVE FORWARD A PROCESS OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION. IF OTHER FUNCTIONS OF THE ICCS WERE TO BE SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT CONFRONTATION AND RIGIDITY BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM. HERE, KULAGA CITED THE EXCHANGE OF POLITICAL DETAINEES, SAYING THAT HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE PROGRESS THAT WAS BEING MADE IN THIS AREA.

6. I SAID THAT AMBASSADOR KULAGA HAD PRODUCES A PLAUSIBLE RATIONALIZATION FOR PERMITTING THE ENTIRE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS TO LAPSE. WE COULD NOT ACCEPT A SITUATION IN WHICH AN IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF THE MACHINERY ESTABLISHED BY THE PARIS AGREEMENTS WAS TOTALLY NEGLECTED. AMBASSADOR FIJALKOWSKI WAS ABOUT TO EMBARK ON HIS CONFIDENTIAL

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ASSIGNMENT IN SAIGON AND IT WAS NECESSARY THAT HE GRASP THE WEIGHT WHICH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT GAVE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION IN THE INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTION OF THE ICCS.

7. SUB-REGIONAL TEAMS. I SAID THAT, WHEN I HAD DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT WITH MINISTER SPASOWSKI ON DECEMBER 22 (WARSAW 6473), HE HAD EXPRESSED THE VIEW OF THE MINISTRY THAT IT HAD BEEN A MISTAKE TO WITHDRAW THE FIVEHBMB-REGIONAL TEAMS AND HAD ASSURED ME THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE FURTHER WITHDRAWALS. I HAD URGED THAT THE FIVE TEAMS BE SENT BACK TO THEIR POSITIONS. THIS HAD NOT HAPPENED AND NOW WE WERE UNPLEASANTLY SURPRISED TO FIND THAT THE POLISH AND HUNGARIAN DELEGATIONS WERE ARGUING IN FAVOR OF THE DESIRABILITY OF WITHDRAWING ADDITIONAL SUB-REGIONAL TEAMS. I FOUND THIS DISAPPOINTING, TO UNDERSTATE OUR REACTION.

8. SPASOWSKI CONFIRMED THE ACCURACY OF WHAT I HAD SAID ABOUT OUR DECEMBER 22 CONVERSATION ON THIS POINT. KULAGA THEN SAID THAT THE POSITION OF THE POLISH DELEGATION ON

THIS MATTER WAS NOT THAT THE TEAMS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN, BUT RATHER THAT EFFECTIVE STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THE TEAMS WERE NOT EXPOSED TO DANGER TO LIFE AND LIMB. IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE RE-LOCATION OF FIELD-ARTILLERY BATTERIES WHICH WERE NOT SITED IN THE VICINITY OF THE TEAMS' QUARTERS AND OFFICES, SO AS TO ELIMINATE, OR SIGNIFICANTLY MINIMIZE, ENDANGERING THE LIVES OF MEMBERS OF THE TEAMS WHEN COUNTER-FIRE WAS EVOKED. FIJALKOWSKI ADDED THAT THERE WAS CONCERN IN THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AT THE PROSPECT OF THE DEATH OF MEMBERS OF THE POLDEL; THE HUNGARIANS HAD LOST TWO MEN AND THE POLISH GOVERNMENT HAD ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE AND, IF POSSIBLE, PREVENT SIMILAR LOSSES.

9. I SAID THAT, WITHOUT PRECISE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND, I WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO ENTER INTO A DETAILED DISCUSSION, NOR DID I THINK THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING I SHOULD DO IN ANY CASE. MY CONCERN WAS THAT OF BRINGING TO AMBASSADOR FIJALKOWSKI'S ATTENTION THE STRENGTH AND DEPTH OF THE CONCERN OF MY GOVERNMENT
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THAT AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE PARIS AGREEMENTS NOT BE FURTHER VITIATED BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF ADDITIONAL TEAMS. ON THE CONTRARY, WE WANTED TO SEE ALL THE SUB-REGIONAL POSTS MANNED, AS THE PROTOCOL ON THE ICCS PROVIDED. WE THEREFORE STRONGLY HOPED THAT THE ICCS, WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE POLDEL, WOULD WORK IN THE DIRECTION OF RETURNING TO THEIR ASSIGNED POSTS ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE TEAMS WHICH HAD EARLIER BEEN WITHDRAWN.

10. RECOGNITION OF THE PRG. FINALLY, I SAID, I WANTED TO REFER TO THE ARTICLES WHICH HAD APPEARED IN THE WARSAW PRESS ON MARCH 3 (WARSAW 1190). I DID NOT WANT TO MAKE A PARTICULAR POINT OF THE POLISH PRESS AGENCY ARTICLE, DATED HANOI, WHICH CONTAINED EXTENSIVE QUOTES FROM THE DRV MARCH 1 NOTE. I COULD NOT HELP NOTING, HOWEVER, THAT, IN PUBLISHING IN THIS FORM ACCUSATIONS THAT THE U.S. WAS VIOLATING THE PARIS AGREEMENTS, THE PRESS WAS GIVING CURRENCY TO A POINT OF VIEW QUITE THE OPPOSITE IN SPIRIT OF WHAT I HAD HEARD FROM MINISTER SPASOWSKI ON DECEMBER 3 (WARSAW 6187, PARAGRAPH 4A). I RECOGNIZED THAT THE ACCUSATION WAS CAREFULLY LEFT IN THE MOUTH OF THE DRV.

11. I DID WANT TO MAKE A POINT OF THE ZYCIE WARSZAWY EDITORIAL OF MARCH 3 WHICH I FOUND OFFENSIVE IN THAT IT APPEARED TO REPRESENT AN ATTEMPT CONSCIOUSLY TO MISLEAD THE READER ABOUT THE POSITION OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

I DID NOT KNOW WHERE THE AUTHOR OF THE EDITORIAL HAD
OBTAINED HIS INFORMATION. I HOPED HE HAD NOT GOTTEN IT
FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. WE ALL KNEW THAT THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE PRG, EITHER DE FACTO OR
IN ANY OTHER WAY, AS A "GOVERNMENT". THERE COULD NOT BE
TWO SOVEREIGNS IN ONE POLITICAL ENTITY. MOREOVER, THE
PARIS AGREEMENT ITSELF CONTAINED A SPECIFIC PROVISION
THAT SIGNATURE BY ONE PARTY DID NOT IMPLY RECOGNITION
BY ANY OF THE OTHERS. AND OUR POSITION HAD BEEN EXPLICITLY
STATED BY THE PRESIDENT ON JANUARY :

'1973. THESE
WERE FACTS WELL KNOWN TO US ALL. SPEAKING FOR MY GOVERNMENT,
I HAD TO REGARD THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THE EDITORIAL AS, AT BEST,
ERRONEOUS, AND, AT WORST, TENDENTIOUS AND CONSCIOUSLY
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DESIGNED TO DECEIVE THE READER. OUR POSITION WAS NOT
LIKELY TO CHANGE, SINCE THIS ORGANIZATION HAD NONE OF

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AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

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THE ATTRIBUTES OF A GOVERNMENT, APART FROM ITS APPROPRIATION OF THAT WORD AS ONE ELEMENT OF ITS NAME. I THEN REHEARSED THE ARGUMENTS CONTAINED IN SAIGON 2146 AND THE DEPARTMENT'S A-1238, CONCLUDING BY NOTING THAT HANOI ITSELF DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE PRG AS A GOVERNMENT, BUT TREATED IT AS A SUBORDINATE INSTRUMENT. WE WERE WELL AWARE OF THE CAMPAIGN THAT WAS BEING CONDUCTED TO OBTAIN DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF THE PRG; THAT WAS WHY WE HAD OPPOSED PRG PARTICIPATION IN THE LAW OF WAR CONFERENCE AND WHY I WAS CONCERNED TO FIND THE POLISH PRESS ADVANCING GROUNDLESS ARGUMENTS TO FURTHER THAT CAMPAIGN.

12. SPASOWSKI SAID I MUST NOT TAKE WHAT WAS WRITTEN IN THE POLISH PRESS AS REPRESENTING THE VIEWS OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT. FIJALKOWSKI THEN SAID THAT, AFTER ALL, THE PRG WAS A SIGNATORY OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS; IT HAD BEEN RECOGNIZED IN THE PARIS AGREEMENTS AS A COMBATANT IN VIETNAM; THE GENEVA CONFERENCE WAS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE HUMANITARIAN GOALS, AND IT SEEMED THAT AN EFFORT TO INVOLVE THE PRG MORE INTIMATELY IN
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CONSIDERATION OF WAYS IN WHICH THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS COULD BE MORE EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED WAS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL THOSE WHO WERE INTERESTED IN ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN VIETNAM.

13. I SAID THERE MIGHT BE DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION IF IT WERE CONFINED TO THE TERMS WHICH FIJALKOWSKI HAD ADVANCED. WHAT STOOD OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF ANY SUCH DISCUSSION WAS THE CLEARLY DELINEATED AND WELL-KNOWN POSITION OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON RECOGNITION OF THE PRG. THE TROUBLE WITH FIJALKOWSKI'S ARGUMENTS WAS THAT THEY WERE NOT DIVORCED FROM OTHER ENDS, BUT WERE ADVANCED IN TACIT FURTHERANCE OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR PRG RECOGNITION OF WHICH I HAD SPOKEN. IT WAS THIS WHICH MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO CONTEMPLATE ACQUIESCING IN A DECISION TO ADMIT THE PRG TO THE LAW OF WAR CONFERENCE.

14. SADRI. KULAGA EXPRESSED GREAT SATISFACTION WITH THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP HE HAD ESTABLISHED WITH SADRI, WHOM HE HAD EARLIER COME TO KNOW AT THE UN. HE SAID THAT THE INDONESIANS WERE "TOO RIGID". IT WAS CLEAR THAT FIJALKOWSKI IS EXPECTED TO CULTIVATE THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH KULAGA AND SADRI HAVE DEVELOPED.

15. GENERAL. I WAS A LITTLE SURPRISED TO GAIN THE IMPRESSION THAT KULAGA HAD LEFT SAIGON WITH MIXED FEELINGS.

WHEN I SAW HIM LAST SEPTEMBER, HE WAS OBVIOUSLY GOING TO HIS NEW ASSIGNMENT WITH RELUCTANCE. HE IS DELIGHTED TO BE RETURNING TO THE UN, SAYING THAT, AMONG DIPLOMATS TODAY, THERE ARE "MULTILATERAL MEN" AND "BILATERAL MEN", HE IS UNEQUIVOCALLY A "MULTILATERAL MAN", AND THE UN IS THE PRIME MULTILATERAL FORUM. BUT, IN CONTRAST TO HIS EVIDENT RESIGNATION LAST FALL TO MAKING THE BEST OF A BAD JOB, HE EXPRESSED AT SEVERAL POINTS--AND HIS REMARKS SEEMED AS MUCH DIRECTED AT FIJALKOWSKI AS AT ME--AN APPARENTLY SINCERE CONVICTION THAT THE POLISH DELEGATION HAD A USEFUL ROLE TO PLAY, BOTH IN THE ICCS AND BETWEEN THE GRV AND THE PRT. HE WAS PROUD OF THE CONTACTS HE HAD DEVELOPED BOTH WITH GENERAL HIEP AND WITH THE "THIRD FORCE" AND OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ICCS'S VISIT TO HANOI. I NOTED THAT SOME OF OUR PEOPLE WERE AFRAID THE POLDEL MIGHT DIMINISH THE CONFIDENTIAL

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USEFULNESS OF THIS PART OF ITS ACTIVITY BY ASSOCIATION WITH MADAME THANH, WHO WE THOUGHT REPRESENTED NOBODY AND WAS A TROUBLE-MAKER. KULAGA DID NOT TRY TO DISPUTE THE SPECIFIC CRITICISM, BUT SAID THAT HE HAD INCLUDED MADAME THANH IN HIS INVITATIONS AS ONE WHO WAS INDUBITABLY A PART OF THE "THIRD FORCE".

16. KULAGA SAID HE BELIEVED THE ICCS COULD BE SUCCESSFUL IN SOME THINGS, IF NOT IN ALL (AN EVIDENT REFERENCE TO INVESTIGATIONS). IF IT FOUND ONE ROAD BLOCKED, IT MUST MOVE ALONG OTHERS. IT SHOULD NOT PRESS SO FAR ALONG ONE ROAD THAT IT ENDED UP IN A BLIND ALLEY WITH NO MEANS OF GETTING BACK. IT COULD ONLY BE EFFECTIVE IF IT WERE ABLE TO DEVELOP A MEASURE OF TRUST ON THE PART OF BOTH THE GRV AND THE PRG. HE EXPRESSED THE CONVICTION THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS IN THIS DIRECTION, SAYING THAT, WHEN THEY HAD MET, HE HAD FOUND GENERAL HIEP QUITE REASONABLE.

17. SUMMING UP FOR THE POLISH SIDE, SPASOWSKI REAFFIRMED THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S CONTINUED SUPPORT OF THE PARIS AGREEMENTS AND REPEATED THAT AMBASSADOR FIJALKOWSKI WAS GOING TO SAIGON UNDER THE SAME INSTRUCTIONS AS KULAGA HAD HAD. SPASOWSKI EXPRESSED AGAIN THE HOPE THAT HE MIGHT BE RECEIVED EARLY IN HIS MISSION BY AMBASSADOR MARTIN.

18. IN RESPONSE, I SAID THAT AMBASSADOR FIJALKOWSKI HAD A BIG PAIR OF SHOES TO FILL. I WAS CONFIDENT THAT HE WOULD MEET WITH THE SAME READINESS ON THE PART OF OUR OFFICIALS IN SAIGON TO RECEIVE HIM AND DISCUSS MATTERS OF CONCERN AS AMBASSADOR KULAGA HAD FOUND. I URGED ONCE AGAIN THAT HE HAVE IN THE FOREFRONT OF HIS MIND OUR STRONG INTEREST IN PROGRESS IN THE INVESTIGATIVE AREA

AND IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF FULL STAFFING OF ALL SUB-REGIONAL POSTS. BEYOND THAT, I SAID, I WISHED HIM LUCK IN CONTINUING THE WORK AMBASSADOR KULAGA HAD BEGIN, DIRECTED AT BRIDGING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE GRV AND THE PRG.

19. LENGTH OF FIJALKOWSKI'S TOUR. NOTHING WAS SAID THAT WOULD INDICATE A LIMITATION ON FIJALKOWSKI'S TOUR TO THE
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SIX-MONTH TERMS OF HIS PREDECESSORS. TO THE CONTRARY, I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT, ALL OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL, HE IS GOING TO SAIGON FOR AT LEAST A YEAR AND POSSIBLY LONGER.
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